



2019 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE EXPORT OF FRENCH ARMAMENTS

WHAT WE'RE NOT TOLD, WHAT MUST CHANGE

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*Cover image: Saudi soldiers fire artillery in Najran, Saudi Arabia near the Yemeni border, 21 April 2015. ©Hasan Jamali/AP/SIPA.
This photo shows a 120mm RT mortar made by the French company TDA Amements SAS.*

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1. OVERVIEW

The first Annual Report to French Parliament, covering the year 1998, was published in March 2000.¹ In the conclusion of this first edition, the report's authors write: *"The challenges relating to arms export are varied and often complex. Over and above an effort towards transparency, this report also intends to provide all the necessary elements to allow its readers to form an opinion in this area, which, up until now, has been relatively unknown."*² On 4 June 2019, the French Ministry of Armed Forces made public the report on armament exports ("the Report to French Parliament"), releasing it to Parliament. It covered the year 2018.³ In its introduction – which might appear unusual in that it seems to echo the mounting debate in France about arms sales – Florence Parly, French Minister of Armed Forces, points out that *"the French people need transparency"*. And specifies: *"We wanted to make it more accessible, clearer and more detailed than previous years"*.⁴

Unfortunately, this attempt did not at all meet the expectations expressed by civil society, nor by some elected officials.⁵ Indeed, the Report to the French Parliament and its appendices, which set out data relating to the flow of authorised arms deals, still do not enable us to know exactly what France is selling. The report provides no information on the type and quantity of war material exported, on the final recipients (army, police or other) or even on the final declared use (maintaining order, defending land, or other use). And yet, this information is essential in order to ensure that there is no major risk that these war materials supplied by France can be used to commit or facilitate exactions, as set out in articles 6 and 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).⁶

The report remains mainly an exercise in justifying the arms trade and an instrument for evaluating the commercial and industrial performance of armaments firms, rather than a document that could be used as a basis for a legitimate and democratic public debate, which would allow effective scrutiny of the export authorisations granted by the French Prime Minister. No information is provided about the decision-making process regarding export control and its concrete implementation. There is a passing mention, with regard to the Near and Middle-East regions, that the government *"uses a strict export control system, [...] assesses carefully and in detail, on a case by case basis, the risks and the validity of each authorisation"*. However, without further details, this statement is just words.

Furthermore, there is still no information provided regarding the export licences that had been refused, by country of destination, nor on the reason for that refusal (for example, violations of international humanitarian law). We realise in the end that in 124 pages, the report provides no response to the guarantees supplied by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate (UAE) with regard to the use of French arms in the Yemen conflict.⁷ Although conclusion of the 1998 Report to French Parliament seems self-evident, the introduction of the 2019 Report to French

¹ Rapport annuel au Parlement 2000 (Résultats 1998) sur les exportations d'armement de la France (Report to French Parliament (Results from 1998) on the Export of French Armaments 2000), French Ministry of Defence, available in French at www.sipri.org/databases/national-reports/France

² *Ibid.*

³ Rapport annuel au Parlement 2019 sur les exportations d'armement de la France (Report to French Parliament on the Export of French Armaments 2019), French Ministry of Armed Forces, available in French at www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/exportations-d-armement-le-rapport-au-parlement-2019

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Amnesty International, *Exportations d'armes : dialogue de sourds et jeu de dupes (Arms Exports: a stand-off and a fools' game)*, available in French at: www.amnesty.fr/controle-des-armes/actualites/exportations-armes-rapport-au-parlement

⁶ Available in French at: <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Traitesurlecommercedesarmes/Traitesurlecommercedesarmes.pdf?templateId=137262>

⁷ The President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron, declared during the Sibiu European Summit (in Romania), on 9 May 2019, that France had a "guarantee" from Saudi Arabia that the arms sold to them were not being used against civilians in Yemen. See twitter.com/amnestyfrance/status/1126839305450786817?s=20

Parliament seems to be an admission of failure, demonstrating the absence of any progress in practising transparency.

Since its first edition, the Report to French Parliament has undergone several changes, some of which have been positive but have only affected the periphery, never really the heart, of the concerns long expressed by civil society.⁸ The document is broadly structured into two main parts: a large narrative section, then the appendices, which provide data relating to the nature of arms transfers authorised by the French Prime Minister. This comprises almost exclusively quantitative and financial information. Since the ATT, of which France is a ratified signatory, came into effect on 24 December 2014, there has been an obligation to produce an annual report of exports, which complements the data of the Report to French Parliament. Nevertheless, this document also has its own limitations. In fact, neither of these reports reveal whether France sold and delivered Talios pods as well as Damoclès pods to Saudi Arabia⁹ (see photos below).

The case of France's arms exports to Saudi Arabia is symptomatic of France's opacity when it comes to trading arms. The Report to French Parliament provides no appropriate clarity on the nature of these arms deals. However, there is open source information available on French arms deployed and used in Yemen, which can be linked with war crimes and other abuse committed by all parties in the conflict. Some of this information comes from research carried out by investigative journalism ('Disclose', #BelgianArms) and NGOs. In this regard, the British Court of Appeal recently highlighted the importance of research carried out by Amnesty International, other NGOs and the United Nations, which contains trusted proven elements regarding the inherent risks of approving arms exports to Saudi Arabia.¹⁰

Since the beginning of the Yemen conflict, France has been continually exporting arms to the Saudi forces, either as a direct supplier or indirectly, such as the case of the Canadian contract for supplying hundreds of light armoured vehicles. France also maintains the operational condition of the equipment it supplies. These deals take place even though there is overwhelming evidence to prove that Saudi Arabia has committed war crimes and other serious violations in Yemen, and that there is an undeniable risk that French armaments may have been, or might still be, used for very serious violations of international humanitarian law. The concerns expressed grew even stronger, until the #BelgianArms investigation revealed on 8 May 2019 that Saudi land forces were indeed taking action on Yemeni soil.¹¹

It is more essential today than ever that every elected official in France immediately prioritises transparency in the French arms trade and that it is subject to ongoing, rigorous and detailed scrutiny. Amnesty International urges France, as well as all other countries, to ensure that no party involved in the Yemen conflict receives – in a direct or indirect way – arms, ammunition, military equipment or technology that is likely to be used in the conflict, as long as these serious violations persist. These restrictions must also be applied to logistical and financial support for these deals.

⁸ See for example "Renforcer la transparence dans le contrôle du commerce des armes" (Increasing transparency in arms trade control), 20 September 2012, available in French at www.obsarm.org/IMG/pdf/position_paper_201212.pdf

⁹ Aymeric Elluin, "Yémen : l'implication de la France ne se dément pas" (Yemen: France's involvement is undeniable), *Mediapart*, 22 March 2019, available in French at <https://blogs.mediapart.fr/amnesty-international/blog/220319/yemen-l-implication-de-la-france-ne-se-dement-pas>

¹⁰ Amnesty International, *UK: Appeal Court ruling on Saudi arms is welcome decision for war-torn Yemen*, 20 June 2019, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/ukappeal-court-ruling-on-saudi-arms-is-welcome-decision-for-wartorn-yemen/>

¹¹ "Belgian arms used in Yemen, Lighthouse Reports", *Lighthouse Reports*, 8 May 2019, available at www.lighthousereports.nl/ourprojects/2019/5/23/belgianarms-used-in-yemen,



Latest generation Talios (Thales) laser designator pod photographed on the SAMI (Saudi Arabian Military Industries) Saudi stand, at the Salon du Bourget (Paris, 17 June 2019) © Amnesty International France



Screen grabs of a message published by SAMI on its official Twitter account, on 17 June 2019, during the Salon du Bourget (Paris), see link: <https://twitter.com/SAMIDefense/status/1140639676300238849?s=20>



2. THE ANNUAL REPORT TO FRENCH PARLIAMENT: A CRITICAL OBSERVATION

TRANSPARENCY AND THE ARMS TRADE: THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

Article 11 of law n°2013-1168 of 18 December 2013 relating to Military Programming for the years 2014 to 2019 and containing various provisions relating to defence and national security, states:

*“Starting from the fiscal year 2015, the annual report on France’s armament exports will be submitted to Parliament by 1st June of each year at the latest”.*¹²

The French Ministry of Armed Forces does not always meet this obligation, as was the case in 2018. It was also the case in 2019, since the Report to French Parliament was published on 4 June, after the news outlet ‘Disclose’ made it public.¹³ France also has international obligations with regard to transparency, since the ATT states in article 13.3 that:

“Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.”

In 2018, and in 2019, the French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, responsible for submitting France’s annual report to the ATT Secretariat, did not meet the fixed deadline of 31 May. In fact, the annual report in question was officially published on the ATT Secretariat’s website on 24 June 2019¹⁴, France made it public in accordance with its usual practice; a practice that not all countries have adopted. Beyond the fact that France does not comply with fundamental obligations relating to the ATT, the annual report has never, to this day, been submitted to Parliamentarians, and even less debated, which is extremely questionable and contrary to the goal for transparency set out by the ATT.

Although the annual report France produces in the context of the ATT brings to light certain complementary information, it is not without its limitations. In fact, the annual report to the ATT only gives information on the seven categories of heavy weapons it covers (combat tanks, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, warships, large calibre artillery systems, missiles and missile launchers) as well as on small arms and light weapons (SALW).

¹² See www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028338825&categorieLien=id

¹³ *Op.cit.*, Rapport au Parlement 2019 sur les exportations d’armement de la France (2019 Report to French Parliament on armament export).

¹⁴ See <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/cafb784e-ea72-3839-a078-edcb072a6f4e>

Therefore, it does not include ammunition, nor the parts and components that are also included in the Arms Trade Treaty. The information given is as follows: weapon category and quantity, by country and by year.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE REPORT TO FRENCH PARLIAMENT

The Report to French Parliament provides information about, but does not provide a clear understanding of, the nature of the arms transfers authorised by the French Prime Minister. This document will not systematically deal with all the elements of the report, but with those that are particularly relevant to this analysis. The information provided in the appendices to the Report to French Parliament are particularly pertinent to our study. We will examine some of these in detail.

With regard to the section: “Detail on orders since 2009 by country”, the Report:

- specifies the overall value of deals by country and by year;
- does not specify the war material concerned;
- does not specify the order dates.

With regard to the section: “Number of licences approved since 2015 by country”, the Report:

- specifies the total number of licences approved by country and by year;
- does not specify the war material concerned;
- does not specify the licence approval dates.

With regard to the section: “Number and value of licences issued in 2018 by country and by categories from the Military List” (22 ML categories), the Report:

- does not specify the types of war materials;
- does not specify if the licences issued translated into orders and deliveries.

With regard to the section: “Detail on material delivered since 2009 by country and by regional distribution”, the Report:

- specifies the overall value of deliveries per country and per year;
- does not specify the types and quantities of war material;
- does not specify delivery dates;
- does not specify the declared end-user and end-use.

With regard to the section: “Transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in 2018”, the Report presents interesting details that are not present for other categories of war material. It:

- specifies the country of destination, the type of arm, the quantity of arms (this is information supplied by France in the context of the ATT annual report);
- but it does not specify the declared end-user and end-use.

The details presented above are essentially an indicator of the economic vitality of the French defence industry rather than data for *a posteriori* scrutiny by civil society, media and Parliament. The Report to French Parliament, currently rather incomplete, must be improved so that it has value as a real monitoring tool.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PARLIAMENTARIANS

Essentially, the information supplied in the appendices to the Report to French Parliament lists the financial value of licences issued, orders and deliveries made. The number and type of war materials that make up each transfer is not specified. In order to achieve a reasonable degree of transparency, this information is essential. Amnesty International is not questioning the need for a certain amount of justified confidentiality on France's part, the point of view that exhaustivity and transparency may involve risking national security or commercial interests. However, the experience of over 30 years has shown that many of these fears about transparency are unfounded.

Most countries, many of whom are large arms exporters (such as the USA, China, Russia, France, Germany and the UK), already regularly publish data on their international commercial arms exchanges and transfers. Whereas previously this was exceptional, the publication of this type of data has become commonplace for many of the main arms dealing countries. Yet, the large arms manufacturers and exporters, who have been publishing exhaustive data for several years already, do not seem to have suffered any repercussions from a commercial point of view. Likewise, these countries are among the most powerful military powers in the world, and the revelation of their arms transfers do not seem to have had any negative effects on their security.

Transparency does not necessitate revealing technical specifications or detailed pricing and contractual information. Most countries have proven that they are able to communicate information about their international arms transfers – and they do so; they have shown their willingness to be transparent, to a greater or lesser extent. It is important to ensure that France presents regular and exhaustive reports, so that any gaps and fuzzy areas will gradually be replaced by transparent information. Greater transparency will also contribute to reducing criticisms of the government when they deliver legitimate defence resources, for example.

A- Recommendations on the report's content. Parliamentary officials must lobby the Minister of Armed Forces to improve the transparency of the Report to French Parliament, which must include as a minimum the following information for each transfer:

- *The partner country (for import, export, transit, transshipment, or transfer),*
- *the type of material,*
- *the quantities of material,*
- *the identity of the end- users and the declared end-use of the material,*
- *the order and delivery dates,*
- *any intermediary parties facilitating the transfer,*
- *any export refusal, along with the reasons,*
- *the financial value of the transfer.*

B- Recommendation on the report's frequency. Another fundamental element is the regular publication of the report, in order to provide updated information. Parliamentary officials must lobby the Minister of Armed Forces to increase the frequency at which the data is published. As well as the consolidated annual report, the Ministry of Armed Forces should publish all relevant data online regularly, for example, quarterly.

- C- Recommendations on the legal deadlines for publishing the different reports (to Parliament and to the ATT).** In addition to the above, Parliamentary officials must ensure that the government meets its obligations with regard to publication deadlines:
- the Ministry of Armed Forces must meet the legal date of 1st June to submit the annual Report to French Parliament on armament exports;
 - the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs must meet the legal date of 31st May to submit the annual report to the ATT and make it public, in the manner that has been practised in France since the ATT came into force;
 - the annual report to the ATT must be sent to all Parliamentary officials or included in the Report to French Parliament, which is already partially the case, since the part relating to SALW that appears in the ATT annual report also appears in the annual Report to French Parliament.
- D- Recommendations on the role of Parliament with regard to scrutiny.** Parliament must exercise ongoing monitoring of the arms sales approved by the French Prime Minister.
- Parliament must periodically organise a real public debate on the Annual Report to French Parliament on the export of French armaments, and on the report to the Arms Trade Treaty, so that decisions granting export licences can be subject to greater public scrutiny.
 - The National Assembly's permanent commissions, the Commission for Foreign Affairs and the Commission for National Defence and the Armed Forces, as well as that of the French Senate, must organise regular public hearings for Ministries taking part in the decision-making and risk analysis process for the export of armaments, with the French General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN), industry players and wider civil society on the subject of French arms transfers.
 - Parliamentary officials must regularly pose both written and spoken questions to Ministries who take part in the arms export control decision-making process in order to contribute to the public debate about France's arms transfers.
 - The National Assembly's permanent commissions, the Commission for Foreign Affairs and the Commission for National Defence and the Armed Forces, as well as that of the French Senate, must provide an exhaustive, critical and detailed report, using the annual report drawn up by the Ministry of Armed Forces and the report to the ATT on the arms trade.
 - The National Assembly's permanent commissions, the Commission for Foreign Affairs and the Commission for National Defence and the Armed Forces, as well as that of the French Senate, must ensure that they have technical skills in the area of armament export, and especially with regard to the legal framework applicable to these exports, in particular the link between adhering to international human rights law and international humanitarian law and arms transfer decisions.
 - Parliament must implement checks to guarantee that France is respecting its international obligations in the area of armament exports.

4. THE CASE OF ARMS TRANSFER TO SAUDI ARABIA, OR OPACITY IN PRACTICE

Since the beginning of the Yemen conflict, France has delivered more than €4.7 billion of war materials to Saudi Arabia. But official data provided by France does not give clarity on the precise nature of the deliveries made. Thus, the Appendices to the Report to French Parliament do not make it clear whether France has explicitly continued to grant export licences for the delivery of Caesar howitzers and ammunition since the beginning of the Yemen conflict; and whether it really has carried out these deliveries. The Appendices do not take into account the complexity of the transfer operations in which France participates, as is the case with the current supply of Canadian armoured combat vehicles to Saudi Arabia, nor the diversity of transfers made (training services). The Report to French Parliament offers no “relevant and essential” information to provide an understanding of the nature and scope of arms transfers carried out, in order to analyse that they meet France’s international commitments.

SUB-CONTRACTING AND MILITARY TRAINING (CMI DEFENCE SAS, COCKERILL CAMPUS)

France is not only a direct supplier to Saudi Arabia, it also supplies indirectly. France supplies not only war materials, also training services.

In 2014, Canada signed the largest armament contract in its history with Saudi Arabia, approved in 2016 by Justin Trudeau’s government. The contract concerns the export of armoured combat vehicles, at a value of 15 billion Canadian dollars. It includes the delivery of 928 LAV 6 Light Armoured Vehicles, produced by the Canadian subsidiary General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS).¹⁵ Since the existence of this contract has been made known, Amnistie Internationale Canada francophone and a coalition of NGOs have been continually campaigning to stop the delivery of these war materials. Following the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the Prime Minister Justin Trudeau undertook to revise the licences granted. However, deliveries went ahead. In the context of the same contract, the Belgian group Cockerill Maintenance & Ingénierie (CMI group, renamed John Cockerill in May 2019) and its defence branch (CMI Defence) won an outsourcing contract. This contract, known as contract AB¹⁶, relates to the delivery of gun turrets (105mm and medium calibre)¹⁷ designed to equip the Canadian armoured vehicles.

France is involved in two clauses in the outsourcing contract won by CMI Defence. Its French subsidiary, CMI Defence SAS, based in Distroff (Moselle), is producing the 105mm gun turrets for the 119 Canadian armoured vehicles that they will equip: *“The gun turrets are made in Distroff, near to Thionville in the Moselle region, the casing of the turrets in Aubange, in*

¹⁵ “Des centaines de véhicules d’assaut vendus à l’Arabie saoudite” (Hundreds of assault vehicles sold to Saudi Arabia), *Radio Canada*, 20 March 2018, available in French at: <https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1090465/vente-chars-assaut-canada-arabie-saoudite>

¹⁶ Nathan Gain, “L’industrie belge, grande oubliée du programme CAMO?” (Has the Belgian Industry been overlooked in the CAMO programme?), *Forces Opérations Blog*, 21 February 2018, available in French at: <http://forcesoperations.com/lindustrie-belge-grande-oubliee-du-scorpion-belge/> See also CMI, Rapport d’activités 2015 (Activity report 2015), *Records sans frontière*, pp.22-23, available at: <https://docplayer.fr/47872374-Records-sans-frontiere-rapport-d-activites-cockerill-maintenance-ingenierie.html>

¹⁷ Pierre Tran, “US Army test-fires Belgian-made gun amid plans for Stryker upgrade competition”, *Defense News*, 19 June 2018, available at: www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/eurosatory/2018/06/19/us-army-test-fires-belgian-made-gun-amid-plans-for-stryker-upgrade-competition/

Belgium”.¹⁸ Then CMI Defence SAS transfers the 105mm gun turrets to Belgium where “the final assembly, 4,000 parts with electronic components, is carried out in Aubange and Liège. More than 100 turrets have been delivered to Canada.”¹⁹ In the context of the ATT and article 4, the export of “parts and components” is to be monitored when they “take a form that makes it possible to assemble conventional weapons”.

France is also involved in a training component.²⁰ In fact, CMI Defence also won a training contract relating to armoured vehicles. With this in mind, the company created the Cockerill Campus in Commercy (Meuse), on a former military site. Its construction was financed to the value of € 70 million by the Belgian company, with a financial contribution made by the French state and the Lorraine region.²¹ In 2015, documents relating to the Commercy development project indicated that the campus on the Suippes firing range “with a 120-person capacity, from 2017 and for seven years, will host soldiers from the Gulf region who will follow a 3-month theory course, followed by a one-month practical course [...]”²², following a framework agreement drawn up with the Ministry of Armed Forces. In April 2019, Geneviève Darrieussecq, the State Secretary to the Ministry of Armed Forces, visited Cockerill Campus.²³

The data submitted by the British government to its Parliament in 2018 confirms this training activity is for Saudi soldiers.²⁴ At the date of the publication of this document, Amnesty International France is unable to confirm whether this training programme for Saudi soldiers has started.

According to the wording in the 2019 Report to French Parliament, France approved export licences for operational training for Saudi Arabia, with a value of € 74 million (licence AMA 4), but no further detail is provided. Nevertheless, this type of information is new. The previous

¹⁸ Michel Cabirol, “CMI, ce groupe belge qui rêve de s’offrir Renault Trucks Defense” (CMI, the Belgian group dreaming of buying Renault Defense Trucks), *La Tribune*, 6 February 2017, available in French at: www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/cmi-ce-groupe-belge-qui-reve-de-s-offrir-renault-trucks-defense-636115.html Henry de Frahan, “Les tourelles de CMI Defence en action au camp de Suippes” (CMI Defence’s gun turrets in action at Suippes camp), *Forces Opérations Blog*, 19 June 2018, available in French at: <http://forcesoperations.com/les-tourelles-de-cmi-defence-en-action-au-camp-de-suippes/> YouTube, John Cockerill, CMI Defence Workshops, published online on 5 October 2018, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=7zzFqVdIF1E

¹⁹ “La Belgique interdit les armes lorraines pour l’Arabie saoudite” (Belgium bans arms made in the Lorraine for Saudi Arabia), *L’Est Républicain*, 18 June 2019, available in French at: www.estrepublicain.fr/actualite/2019/06/18/la-belgique-interdit-les-armes-lorraines-pour-l-arabie-saoudite

²⁰ Philippe Lawson, “CMI décroche un contrat de 5 milliards en Arabie saoudite” (CMI wins a 5 billion euro contract from Saudi Arabia), *L’Echo*, 28 August 2014, available in French at: www.lecho.be/entreprises/industries-de-base/cmi-decroche-un-contrat-de-5-milliards-en-arabie-saoudite/9538447.html

²¹ La Région Lorraine, “Subvention à l’entreprise Campus Cockerill : la réalité des faits !” (Funding for Campus Cockerill: the facts!), *Facebook*, 7 December 2015, available in French at:

www.facebook.com/laRegionLorraine/photos/a.444103332319767/1072373846159376/?type=3 See also “Formation de militaires Saoudiens : 600 000 euros d’aide de la Lorraine qui dérangent” (Training for Saudi soldiers: the € 600,000 funding from the Lorraine region that is causing upset), *L’Est Républicain*, 8 December 2015, available in French at: www.estrepublicain.fr/actualite/2015/12/08/formation-de-militaires-saoudiens-600-000-euros-d-aide-de-la-lorraine-qui-derangent

²² “Projet d’aménagement Commercy : dossier de demande de dérogation au titre de l’article L411-2 du code de l’environnement” (Commercy development project: exemption request under article L411-2 of the French Environmental Code), 30 March 2016, available in French at: www.grand-est.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/caserne_commercy_hirondelles_annexe_t.pdf See also Darren Calabrese, “Armoured vehicles in Saudi deal will pack lethal punch”, *The globe and mail*, 6 January 2016, available in English at:

www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/armoured-vehicles-in-saudi-deal-will-pack-lethal-punch/article28046099/

²³ “Photos. La reconversion réussie du campus Cockerill à Commercy saluée par une secrétaire d’Etat” (Photos. The successful conversion of the Cockerill Campus praised by a Parliamentary Secretary), *L’Est Républicain*, 16 April 2019, available in French at: www.estrepublicain.fr/edition-de-bar-le-duc/2019/04/16/photos-la-reconversion-reussie-du-campus-cockerill-a-commercy-saluee-par-une-secretaire-d-etat#0_4

²⁴ In the UK, the Committee on Arms Export Control of the House of Commons, with no equivalent in French Parliament, is involved in examining transfers of British arms to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. On 14 March 2018, a request was sent to the Department for International Trade – which has the responsibility of controlling arms exports – to obtain a detailed list of export licences granted for transfers to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This information was indeed communicated and is available on the British government website and at this link (see tab SIELs-incorporation-no munition) <http://bit.ly/2YvQqbh>

versions of the report to French Parliament had not included such information. In any case, this type of training, falling under the category of “related material” has been subject to export control on the same basis as war materials only since 2017.²⁵ The question remains to understand the conditions under which the training contract for Saudi soldiers was subject to an export licence.

In March 2019, Amnistie Internationale Canada francophone and a coalition of NGOs sent an open letter to the Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to demand the cancellation of the armoured vehicle export licences: *“These vehicles are at risk of being used in the current Yemen conflict to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law. In fact, credible media sources are reporting that LAVs may have already been used in this conflict. This is why we call on all countries to ban the sale and transfer of arms to governments where there is a risk of using these arms in the Yemen conflict.”*²⁶

In Belgium, following revelations by investigative journalists #BelgianArms, which proved that gun turrets designed by CMI Defence were used in Yemen, on 8 May 2019 Amnesty International Belgique francophone called for the establishment of a parliamentary commission.

It is in this context that the Belgian Council of State, following proceedings brought by the Belgian Ligue des droits humains (LDH – League of Human Rights) and the Coordination Nationale d'Action pour la Paix et la Démocratie (CNAPD – National Coordination for Peace and Democracy), in December 2017, rescinded several export licences for Saudi Arabia on 14 June 2019²⁷, including those relating to CMI Defence’s gun turrets, with the explanation that the government of the Walloon region had not taken into account *“the background of the purchasing country in certain areas, including respecting its international obligations with regard to the use of force and international humanitarian law.”*²⁸

The licences in question had been granted in October 2017 and completed, and the LDH and the CNAPD filed a criminal complaint against CMI Defence (and also FN Herstal) for having exported military material to Saudi Arabia under a contract containing a clause with the following wording: *“The validity of this licence will be suspended if the receiving country is involved in an international or internal conflict.”*²⁹ In support of this action, Amnesty International Belgique francophone issued a reminder that in order to *“justify its arms sales to*

²⁵ See https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?id=JORFTEXT000035355503

²⁶ Amnistie Internationale Canada francophone, *Des ONG maintiennent que le Canada doit prendre une décision concernant la vente de véhicules blindés légers à l'Arabie saoudite* (NGOs claim that Canada must take a decision regarding the sale of light armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia), 5 March 2019, available in French at:

<https://amnistie.ca/sinformer/communiqués/local/2019/canada/ong-maintiennent-que-canada-doit-prendre-une-decision>

²⁷ This rescindment is among the various requests for suspension and revocation concerning 28 export licences for Saudi Arabia submitted by the LDH belge and the CNAPD to the Belgian Council of State, in December 2017. This action came to an initial conclusion in June 2018. It resulted in the suspension of some of the licences by the Council of State. The judge believed that these licences had been granted even though the catastrophic assessment of the Saudi Regime’s respect for human rights had been known and documented for several years. See Amnesty International Belgique francophone, *L'arrêt du Conseil d'État est une bonne nouvelle, mais plus de transparence est essentiel*, ('Council of State ruling is good news, but more transparency is essential') 30 June 2018, available in French at: www.amnesty.be/infos/actualites/wallonie-transparente

²⁸ “Conseil d'Etat. Licences d'exportation d'armes vers l'Arabie Saoudite: Annulation” (Council of State, Armament export licences to Saudi Arabia: Revoked), judgement 244.804, available in French at: www.raadvst-conseil.be/?page=news&lang=fr&newsitem=541 François Witvrouw, “Nouveau coup d'arrêt pour l'exportation d'armes wallonnes en Arabie saoudite” (Judgement new blow for Walloon arms exports to Saudi Arabia), *L'Echo*, 14 June 2019, available in French at: www.lecho.be/entreprises/general/nouveau-coup-d-arret-pour-l-exportation-d-armes-wallonnes-en-arabie-saoudite/10136599.html See also Amnesty International Belgique francophone, *Annulation de plusieurs licences d'exportations d'armes wallonnes* (Revocation of several Walloon arms export licences), 14 June 2019, available in French at: www.amnesty.be/infos/actualites/armes-conseil-etat?lang=fr

²⁹ Amnesty International Belgique francophone, *#BelgianArms : Il faut une Commission d'enquête parlementaire* (#BelgianArms: There must be a Parliamentary Commission), 8 May 2019, available in French at: www.amnesty.be/infos/actualites/belgianarms LDH belge, *Exportation d'armes wallonnes en Arabie saoudite : la Justice appelée au secours des droits fondamentaux* (Export of Walloon arms to Saudi Arabia: the Courts summoned in defence of fundamental rights), 8 May 2019, available in French at: www.liguedh.be/exportation-darmes-wallonnes-en-arabie-saoudite-la-justice-appellee-au-secours-des-droits-fondamentaux/

Riyad, the Walloon Region has insisted over the past years that they were only meant for the Saudi Royal Guard and the National Guard, who were operating within the country.”³⁰ However, the investigation by #BelgianArms revealed “the presence of the National Guard in Yemen, equipped with tanks, with gun turrets and ammunition manufactured in Belgium”.³¹ On 19 June 2019, Canada joined the ATT, becoming the 104th member state.

DELIVERIES OF CAESAR HOWITZERS AND AMMUNITIONS (NEXTER)

In France, following the revelations by the news outlet ‘Disclose’ on 7 May 2019, discussing the loading of eight Caesar howitzers, the French Minister of the Armed Forces confirmed publicly on 8 May 2019³², that the Saudi cargo ship *Bahri Yanbu* would load with French armaments.³³ According to the Minister, it was a shipment that came under “a commercial contract that was agreed several years ago.”³⁴ Due to public pressure, in the end the ship did not load its cargo of armaments. The French government never subsequently made public what happened to this shipment and whether, in the end, it had been delivered. The absence of a clear, exhaustive and detailed explanation from the government fed legitimate suspicions about the shipment of these French arms via another Saudi ship, the *Bahri Tabuk*, in the port of Marseille-Fos, on 28-29 May 2019.³⁵ This ship arrived from the Canadian port of Saint John where it loaded armoured combat vehicles destined for Saudi Arabia (see above). For its part, the news outlet ‘Disclose’ revealed that, according to its sources, the ship was going to load Nexter ammunition for the Caesar howitzer at Marseille-Fos, in the context of the OASIS 6 contract.³⁶ Eventually, several sources denied that military material was being loaded and ‘Disclose’ announced that the expected loading finally was planned to take place at another location, according to their sources.

→ THE CASE OF CAESAR HOWITZERS (NEXTER)

Amnesty International, along with other organisations, documented Saudi Arabia’s deployment of Caesar howitzers in the Yemen conflict³⁷, while the news outlet ‘Disclose’ revealed the risk to civilian populations of being caught in their fire. The various Reports to Parliament do not reveal anything about deliveries of Caesar howitzers to Saudi Arabia. In the absence of official information on the export of the Caesar howitzers, it is via research into different sources of information in the public domain that details to prove French transfer of this type of equipment have been found. The first contract (ME76) for the supply of Caesar howitzers to the Saudi National Guard took place in 2006 for the supply of 80 items.³⁸ A second contract (ME4B) was

³⁰ Vincent Georis, “La FN et CMI attaquées en justice pour leurs ventes d’armes à l’Arabie saoudite” (FN and CMI attacked in court for their arms sales to Saudi Arabia), *L’Echo*, 8 May 2019, available in French at: www.lecho.be/economie-politique/belgique/federal/la-fn-et-cmi-attaquees-en-justice-pour-leurs-ventes-d-armes-a-l-arabiasaoudite/10124867.html

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² “Florence Parly face à Jean-Jacques Bourdin en direct” (Florence Parly talks to Jean-Jacques Bourdin live), BFMTV, 8 May 2019, available in French at: www.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/florence-parly-face-a-jean-jacques-bourdin-en-direct-1159665.html

³³ [Révélations] Yémen: de nouvelles armes françaises expédiées en secret vers l’Arabie saoudite (Yemen: new French arms sent secretly to Saudi Arabia), ‘Disclose’, 7 May 2019, available in French at: <http://bit.ly/2WXYrJ6>

³⁴ *Op.cit.*, “Florence Parly face à Jean-Jacques Bourdin en direct”.

³⁵ Amnesty International, *France: Authorities must stop arms-laden ship of shame bound for Saudi Arabia*, 28 May 2019, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/05/france-authorities-must-stop-armsladen-ship-of-shame-bound-for-saudi-arabia/>

³⁶ “[Révélations] Des munitions de canons Caesar expédiées vers l’Arabie saoudite depuis Marseille” (Caesar howitzer ammunition sent to Saudi Arabia from Marseille), ‘Disclose’, available in French at: <http://bit.ly/2RAJ041>

³⁷ Amnesty International, *France: Leaked military documents underscore the need to end the flow of arms to the Yemen conflict*, available at: www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2019/04/france-leaked-military-documents-underscore-need-to-end-flow-of-arms-to-yemen-conflict/

³⁸ “Soflog Telis en manœuvre” (Soflog Telis on exercise), *Stratégies logistique*, 22 August 2011, www.strategie-logistique.com/soflog-telis-en-manoeuvre_3631

agreed in 2009 for the supply of 20 items, also for the Saudi National Guard.³⁹ The 100 artillery items were delivered in 2010-2011, in the form of kits to be assembled.⁴⁰ The voluntary declarations France made to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, established at the beginning of the 1990s⁴¹, partially confirms this information. France did not make a declaration in 2009, nor in 2010, and in 2011 there is no mention of any export of Caesar howitzers. However, in 2013, it indicated that it exported three Caesar kits to Saudi Arabia without providing any further details, as well as 25 artillery guns in 2014, which are, in all events, Caesar kits. Between 2010 and 2014, France would have therefore delivered at least 128 Caesar howitzers to Saudi Arabia, if we include all information relating to contracts ME76, ME4B and that available on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. This information is corroborated by data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which reports the export of 132 Caesar howitzers between 2010 and 2015.⁴² The annual report to the ATT, published on 24 June 2019, provided new information about France's delivery of artillery guns to Saudi Arabia. Thus, in 2018, France delivered eighty 155mm howitzers to Saudi Arabia.⁴³ This information calls for various observations to be made. Firstly, France's transparency appears to be limited since it only mentions the calibre of the howitzers and not their name. According to trusted public information, these were Caesar howitzers. Besides, the news outlet 'Disclose' revealed the delivery, in October 2018, of a dozen Caesar howitzers to Saudi Arabia, which were loaded on the *Bahri Jazan* in the port of Le Havre.⁴⁴ Secondly, the annual report to the ATT was not submitted by the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs to Parliament. Thirdly and finally, the information provided by the Report to French Parliament on the categories of war materials subject to an export licence since the beginning of the conflict does not make clear if these licences explicitly cover the Caesar howitzers (see table 1 below).

Table 1: licences granted for the ML2 category (canons, howitzers, artillery guns, mortars, etc.)⁴⁵ within the list of war materials subject to export control⁴⁶

Year	Number of licences	Value of licences in euros
2015	10	4,018,935,572
2016	10	2,979,181,500
2017	2	803,013,000
2018	10	710,224,108
Total	32	8,511,354,180

→ THE CASE OF DELIVERIES OF AMMUNITION (SHELLS AND ARTILLERY FUSES) FOR CAESAR HOWITZERS

Once again, the different editions of the Report to French Parliament do not give any information about the delivery of ammunition that can be used by the Caesar howitzers, apart from the information listed in table 2 below. In addition, the Report to French Parliament does not mention the name of the contracts signed, nor the date on which they were signed – so there is

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ The following information shows a Caesar howitzer exhibited at the AFED (The Armed Forces Exhibition for Diversity of Requirements & Capabilities) Salon organised by the Saudi Minister of Defence on 25 February to 3 March 2019, in Riyadh https://twitter.com/SAUDI_AFN/status/968474992106188801

⁴¹ Information from the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was, as of May 2019 on the old version of the website, which has been deleted. The new version of the site is still not updated at the time of writing this document.

⁴² See www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers

⁴³ See <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/cafb784e-ea72-3839-a078-edcb072a6f4e>

⁴⁴ See <https://made-in-france.disclose.ngo/fr/chapter/the-route-of-a-secret-shipment>

⁴⁵ Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre equal or exceeding 20 mm, other arms or armaments of a calibre exceeding 12.7 mm (0.5 inch calibre), projectors, projectile launchers and accessories, as follows, and their specially-designed components.

⁴⁶ *Op.cit.*, Rapport annuel 2019 au Parlement sur les exportations d'armement (Annual Report 2019 to French Parliament on armament exports).

no mention of the OASIS 6 contract agreed by Nexter with Saudi Arabia, which was revealed by the news outlet 'Disclose'.

Table 2: licences granted for the ML3 category (ammunition, etc.)⁴⁷ within the list of war materials subject to export control⁴⁸

Year	Number of licences	Value of licences in euros
2015	12	581,452,395
2016	9	242,790,461
2017	11	1,325,269,384
2018	12	742,667,306
Total	44	2,892,179,546

Again, open sources provide a few details without claiming to be exhaustive. Thus, according to publicly available information, there were fears in November 2018 that Nexter Munitions would not meet its 2018 turnover goal unless it obtained the export licence for the latest OASIS contract (without qualifying that this was the OASIS 6 contract), of which around € 100 million had been achieved by 1st October 2018 out of the expected € 250 million.⁴⁹ Following the revelations by the news outlet 'Disclose' (as mentioned above) regarding the loading of ammunition for Caesar howitzers at Marseille-Fos, the French Minister of Armed Forces at no time confirmed nor denied this information. The question therefore remains.

According to publicly available information, the Nexter group⁵⁰ is an historical supplier of ammunition to Saudi Arabia, in particular large calibre ammunition. The Nexter group includes an ammunition division made up of Nexter Munitions and Mecar companies (Belgium) and Simmel Diffesa (Italy). These two companies have been bought in recent years by the Nexter group. All of these three entities form the ABG division (Ammunition Business Group). Nexter Munitions depends on Saudi Arabia for 55% of its business and Mecar for 80%.⁵¹ The Nexter group also bought out SNPE, of which the company Eurengo is a wholly-owned subsidiary. Saudi Arabia is one of Eurengo's main customers.⁵² On 8 May 2019, Belgian media revealed the investigation #BelgianArms⁵³ which proved that arms from Belgium were being used in Yemen. The investigation revealed that 90 mm F3/F4 HET-T (M678) ammunition⁵⁴ produced by Mecar, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Nexter group, was used in Yemen.⁵⁵

In March 2018, the company Eurengo, which manufactures modular propelling charges for artillery munitions, had its production stopped by Nitrochemie, part of the German defence group Rheinmetall and Swiss defence group Ruag⁵⁶ who had been its supplier of powder since

⁴⁷ Ammunitions and fuse-settings devices, as follows, and their specially-designed components, covering in particular, categories ML1 and ML2.

⁴⁸ *Op.cit.*, Rapport annuel 2019 au Parlement sur les exportations d'armement (Annual Report 2019 to French Parliament on armament exports).

⁴⁹ Minutes of group meeting of 22 November 2018, CGT Nexter, available at:

www.fnte.cgt.fr/giat/IMG/pdf/181122_cr_comite_de_groupe.pdf

⁵⁰ Since December 2015, the German company KMW and Nexter have formed part of the Franco-German European group KNDS.

⁵¹ *Op.cit.*, Minutes of group meeting of 22 November 2018.

⁵² Clément Pougeoise, "Ces explosifs "made in Bergerac" qui séduisent le monde entier et ont créé 42 emplois" (These 'made in Bergerac' explosives that are seducing the whole world and have created 42 jobs), *Sud Ouest*, 28 September 2017, available in French at: www.sudouest.fr/2017/09/28/des-explosifs-made-in-bergerac-pour-l-armee-francaise-l-inde-et-l-arabie-saoudite-3815435-1733.php

⁵³ "Des armes fabriquées en Wallonie tuent au Yémen" (Arms made in Wallonia are killing in Yemen), *Le Soir.be*, 8 May 2019, available in French at: www.lesoir.be/222899/article/2019-05-08/des-armes-fabriquees-en-wallonie-tuent-au-yemen

⁵⁴ See www.mecar.be/data/115685925590mmM678.pdf and see the Nexter Munitions (ABG) catalogue, 2015 edition available at: <https://studylib.net/doc/25243324/catalogue-nexter-abg>

⁵⁵ Amnesty International Belgique, #BelgianArms : Il faut une Commission d'enquête parlementaire (#BelgianArms: there must be a Parliamentary investigation committee).

⁵⁶ Julie Tejerizo, "Sous embargo allemand, Eurengo dans un avenir incertain" (With the German embargo, Eurengo faces an uncertain future), *L'Echo-info*, 12 March 2018, available in French at: www.l-echo.info/article/bergerac/2018-03-12/sous-embargo-allemand-eurengo-dans-avenir-incertain-58763.html Pascal Faiseaux, "Embargo militaire : le poudrier Eurengo de Bergerac craint pour l'emploi" (Military embargo: the Eurengo powder factory fears for jobs), *France 3 Régions/France TV Info*, 13

2014⁵⁷. This situation was a result of a German decision to place an embargo on arms destined for Saudi Arabia. The powder supplied by Nitrochemie was used in the manufacture of modular propelling charges⁵⁸ to equip 155mm ammunition used by the Saudi Caesar howitzers. In the end, powder produced by Simmel Diffesa (Italy) was qualified as a replacement to that supplied by Nitrochemie, according to information dating from November 2018.⁵⁹

Furthermore, according to a public source, in November 2016⁶⁰ the German company Junghans Microtec GmbH was granted permission to deliver artillery fuses to France⁶¹ that were destined to equip artillery munitions sold to Saudi Arabia (41,644 multifunctional artillery fuses)⁶², confirmed by the German Federal Minister for the Economy and Energy on 3 August 2017.⁶³

To conclude, visual data is available open source. It shows Saudi land forces using ammunition made by Nexter (see Appendix): 155 mm LU 111 BB shells, 155 mm LU-211 HB shells, 155 mm LU-214 shells, 155 mm LU 217 MS SMK shells.

DELIVERY OF 120 MM AMMUNITION (TDA ARMEMENTS SAS)

Historically and before the beginning of the Yemen conflict, France had delivered other types of artillery to Saudi Arabia than the Caesar howitzers. It had previously supplied 120 mm RT mortars produced by TDA Armement SAS, a subsidiary of Thales. According to information supplied by *IISS Military Balance* 2016⁶⁴, the Saudi army had 110 units. From the beginning of the conflict, they were active.⁶⁵ Once again, the different editions of the Report to French Parliament tell us nothing about the delivery of ammunition that could be used with artillery systems other than the Caesar howitzers (see table 2 above). However, visual data is available open source. This shows artillerymen from the Saudi land army engaging in the Yemen conflict, deploying 120 mm RT mortars and its ammunition manufactured by TDA Armements SAS (see Appendix).

March 2018, available in French at: <https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/nouvelle-aquitaine/dordogne/bergerac/embargo-militaire-poudrier-eurenco-bergerac-craint-emploi-1439851.html>

⁵⁷ "Rheinmetall Nitrochemie, Nexter Munitions Sign Agreement" *Al Defaiya*, 6 February 2014, available in English at: www.defaiya.com/news/International%20News/Europe/2014/02/06/rheinmetall-nitrochemie-nexter-munitions-sign-agreement

⁵⁸ See www.eurenco.com/content/combustible-items/defence-security/modular-artillery-charges/

⁵⁹ *Op.cit.*, Minutes of Group Committee Meeting, 22 November 2018.

⁶⁰ Response of the German Federal Government to the written question from Parliamentary officials Heike Hansel, Christine Buchholz, Sevim Daðdelen, and others and the group Die Linke, Subject: Humanitarian Catastrophe and maritime blockade by Saudi Arabia off the Yemeni coast, Drucksache18/12788, 19 June 2017, available in German at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/127/1812788.pdf>

⁶¹ An artillery fuse is a device fixed onto the warhead of an artillery shell to make it explode.

⁶² Jean Périer, "Saudi Arabia Carries on its Deadly Harvest in Yemen", *New Eastern Outlook*, 14 January 2017, available in English at: <https://journal-neo.org/2017/01/14/saudi-arabia-carries-on-its-deadly-harvest-in-yemen/> See the original article in German, Von Gerald Traufetter, 'Deutsche Artilleriezünder für Saudi-Arabien', *Der Spiegel*, 1^{er} December 2016, available at: www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ruestungsexporte-bundesregierung-genehmigt-artilleriezuender-fuer-saudi-arabien-a-1123858.html

⁶³ Response of the German Secretary of State for the Federal Ministry of the Economy and Energy, Mathias Machnig, to the written question from Parliamentary officials Sevim Dagdelen, Annette Groth, Heike Hansel, Andrei Hunko, Susanna Karawanskij and the group Die Linke, Subject: "Rheinmetall and other arms companies in Turkey and the Gulf States and the globalisation of the arms industry", BT-Drucksache: 18/13074, 3 August 2017, available in German at: www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Parlamentarische-Anfragen/2017/18-13074.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4

⁶⁴ "Future Mortar Systems Requirements & Holdings", 22 August 2016, www.defenceiq.com/army-land-forces/whitepapers/future-mortar-systems-requirements-holdings

⁶⁵ YouTube, Three Saudi soldiers and a UAE soldier killed on the Yemeni border (translation from original title in Arabic), Television Al-arabi, published online on 25 June 2015, available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5RdVHpCtSU; See also photos by Hasan Jamal, for AP, on 21 April 2015 which corroborate the images reported by the channel Al-arabi. They were taken at the border with Yemen in Najran, in Saudi Arabia <http://bit.ly/2y9bnNw> <http://bit.ly/2LGBYdI> <http://bit.ly/2LDGhX3> <http://bit.ly/2YIZORY>

5. APPENDIX

155 mm LU 211 IM HB Shell (Nexter)

- Screen capture from a video published by the Saudi Ministry of the National Guard on its official Twitter account, on 25 May 2019 (see 01:08 to 01:13)
<https://twitter.com/sanggovsa/status/1132394785786998789?s=20>
- Translation of the tweet in Arabic: “Posted from the borders... worshippers of God... Fasters, may God preserve our country and our soldiers from harm” # Ministry for National Guard



- Screen capture from Nexter Munitions (ABG) catalogue, 2015 edition:
<https://studylib.net/doc/25243324/catalogue-nexter-abg>

155 mm LU-214 Sh



FIELD ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

Field Artillery Ammunition

155mm LU 211

INSENSITIVE OR CONVENTIONAL VERSION



MISSION

The LU 211 HE shell provides a long-range fire capability. It engages targets at a range of 30km with NATO standard 155mm/39 calibre guns (M109, M198...), and at a range of 40km with 155mm/52 calibre guns (CAESAR®, PZH2000...) meeting the requirements of JB MoU and NABK standards. The efficiency of the LU 211 HB and BB versions, based on a same standard shell body (blast and fragmentation), is more than twice that conventional 155mm shells, irrespective of angle of impact or burst height. In addition, its piercing/penetration capability gives an excellent performance when used as an anti-structure ammunition.

The LU 211 shell can be filled with High Explosive like TNT, compo B and EIDS® XF 13 333 explosive composition for the insensitive version called LU 211 IM. This version is fully IM compliant with the STANAG 4439. To be able to meet specific requirements, different versions for training are offered.

TECHNICAL DATA

	LU 211 HB	LU 211 BB
Tabular weight with fuze	43.25kg	44.65kg
Length without fuze	769mm	771mm
Maximum range	30km	40km

- Left: photograph of an artilleryman extracting a Nexter 155mm LU 214 shell from a Saudi National Guard Caesar howitzer, accompanying the article: Abdullah Al La'jem, Jaber Madkhali (Najran province), "National Guard: we killed the Houthis leader", *Al Watan*, 13 August 2016, available at: <http://bit.ly/2XOfCtR>
- Right: photograph (reported on twitter on 19 November 2016) of an artilleryman from the Saudi National Guard getting ready to load a Caesar howitzer with a 155 mm LU 214 shell, translation of the inscription on the shell from Arabic to English: "Dedicated to the tribe Al-masarir to the Houthis, enemies of God", available at: https://twitter.com/green_lemonn/status/799934490634113026



- Screen capture of the Nexter Munitions (ABG) catalogue, 2015 edition: <https://studylib.net/doc/25243324/catalogue-nexter-abg>

Field Artillery Ammunition



FIELD ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

155mm LU 214



MISSION

The LU 214 is a smoke shell belonging to the 52 calibre shell family. It offers the range capability of the LU 211 HE shell.

TECHNICAL DATA

	LU 214 HB	LU 214 BB
Tabular weight with fuze	43.25kg	44.65kg
Length without fuze	769mm	771mm
Maximum range	30km	40km
Size (m) and duration (s) of the smoke screen	-200m/180s	-200m/180s

155 mm LU-217 MS SMK Shell (Nexter)

- Photograph of a Nexter 155 mm LU 217 MS SMK Shell near a Saudi Caesar howitzer. The translation of the inscription on the shell means: “King Saoud Medical City. Thank you for your effort and your support”. It is the same on all the photos in the following article, from which the photo below comes: “Soldiers posted on the borders thanking the King Saoud Medical City in their own way”, 28 December 2015, available in Arabic at: <http://www.faifaonline.net/portal/2015/12/28/237793.html>. See also the following article: “Photos: soldiers posted on the southern border send a special message inscribed on the shell destined for the King Saoud Medical City”, 31 December 2015, available in Arabic at: <https://mz-mz.net/579604/>



- Screen capture of the Nexter Munitions (ABG) catalogue, 2015 edition: <https://studylib.net/doc/25243324/catalogue-nexter-abg>

nexter
MUNITIONS

FIELD ARTILLERY AMMUNITION

Field Artillery Ammunition

155mm LU 217 MS SMK



MISSION
The LU 217 is a multi-spectral smoke shell belonging to the 52 calibre shell family. The base ejected payload operates in the infrared and visible spectrum.

TECHNICAL DATA

Maximum range capability	Compatible with modular charge system up to Z6
Payload delivery range	~90% of the maximum ballistic range
Spectrum Bandwidth	0.4µm to 12µm
Duration	120-150 seconds

155 mm LU-111 BB Shell (Nexter)⁶⁶

- Photo of a Nexter 155 mm LU-111 BB shell from articles: “ In video and photos, the funeral of Abou Zined and armed forces launch a shell in his name” (translation of the original Arabic title), 27 November 2015, available in Arabic at: <https://galamsa.com/?p=14292> “Launch of a shell on the Huthi in the name of the Saudi journalist "Abu Zined Al-omari"” (translation of original Arabic title), Yemen Press, 28 November 2015, available in Arabic at: <https://yemen-press.com/news62445.html>
- Translation of Arabic text on the photo: “Dedicated to Abou Zined may God have mercy on him”



⁶⁶ “Artillery Ammunition (Europe)”, *Forecast International*, November 2010, available at: www.forecastinternational.com/archive/disp_pdf.cfm?DACH_RECNO=818 See also: <http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product4665.html>









120 mm Shell (TDA Armements SAS)

- Photograph of an 120 mm artillery shell produced by TDA Armements SAS, taken from the article “In images... Discover the life of Saudi soldiers on the borders” (translation of the original Arabic title), *Taiz Online*, 3 February 2016, available in Arabic at: <https://www.taizonline.com/news2557.html>. The article presents images published by the Saudi Press Agency (WAS) to show the daily life of the Saudi soldiers on the borders (these are land army soldiers). The other images published in the article show a 120 mm RT shell produced by TDA Armements SAS.
- This is either a Rifled High Explosive (HE) projectile, or Rifled Rocket Assisted Projectile (RAP).



- Screen capture of a TDA Armements SAS brochure:
<http://www.tda-armements.com/sites/tda/files/Mortar%20Systems%20120.pdf>

Particularly complete, TDA ARMEMENTS SAS' catalog of 120 mm rifled ammunitions allow to face all the operational scenarios which the troops in the contact can be brought to implement in a modern and tough battlespace

HE		Rifled High Explosive (HE) projectile <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Maximal range: 8,200 meters• Very efficient against all types of targets
RAP		Rifled Rocket Assisted Projectile (RAP) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Maximal range: 13 kilometres• Efficiency equivalent to this of the HE projectile
AAP		Rifled Anti Armour Projectile (AAP) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Neutralization of light armored vehicles
SMK		Rifled Smoke (SMK) projectile <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Operational marking of target• Masking of own troops' movements• Blinding of enemy troops
PRAC		Rifled PRACTice projectile <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Instruction of servants and observers• Impact marking ammunition with extremely reduced collateral effects
ILLUM		Rifled ILLUMinating (ILLUM) projectile <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Production of visible lighting• Illumination of the battlefield
IR ILLUM		Rifled InfraRed ILLUMinating (IR ILLUM) projectile <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Production of an infrared beam• Illumination of the battlefield visible only with infrared optics
IM		Insensitive Munitions (IM) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Renewal of the whole 120 mm ammunitions' catalog

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2019 ANNUAL REPORT ON FRENCH ARMS EXPORTS

WHAT WE ARE NOT TOLD, WHAT MUST CHANGE

July 2019

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